a peer reviewed academic journal that addresses society's treatment of animals' (Shapiro, 2007, n. p.) . Savage-Rumbaugh (2007) , using lexigram and keyboard synthesis technologies, has taught trans-species communication skills to bonobos for years. Through a question and answer process, she ascertained what the bonobos value -fresh food, opportunities to explore, lifelong relationships with loved ones, teaching their young, and living free of fear of humans. That the apes are listed as co-authors of the article is a significant statement about other-than-human animal involvement and participation in research about them. Savage-Rumbaugh (quoted in Shapiro, 2007, n. p.) 
says:
If the participation of human beings [in such a study] had been equal to that of the bonobos, no one would object to the sharing of authorship. It therefore seems proper to recognize not only the bonobos' contribution to this article, but also their right to have a legitimate voice -their own voice -in determining the adequacy of the environments in which they reside.
What is important to take from this quotation is the idea of animals having both a right to and a method of expressing their voices and of being heard with the aim of furthering their interests. The language human beings have available, or more accurately do not, to communicate with animals-other-than-human is one of the reasons I came to this topic. Scholars wrestle with finding a term that disassembles the hierarchical nature of speaking about other animals. This is similar to privileging race by terms such as non-white or finding language for incorporating what or who has been socially constructed as Other into mainstream discourse. In this article, the term 'animal' is sometimes used for ease of reading, but when possible, more descriptive expressions such as Abram's (1997) 'more than human animal' and other-than-human animal are used, always mindful of the importance of thinking about animals not only as a group, but as a group made up of individuals. 1 As discussed in this article, research, observation, dialogue, voicing, recognition, and reporting are key components of participatory action research (PAR). Action research is both a philosophy and a powerful method for human beings to work collaboratively with subjects to establish dialogue/voice so that those excluded from the system of power and knowledge can become active agents in 'the wider ecology in which we participate ' (Reason & Bradbury, 2006, p. xxii) . I argue PAR has the emancipatory potential to reach beyond human beings, representing a radical and revolutionary opportunity to recognize trans-species communication as we look for practical solutions to urgent socio-ecological problems.
I begin with the premise that it is important to recognize other-than-human animal's needs to express basic biological requirements for food, water, protection from the elements, a need for space (territory), opportunities to mate, and places to raise their young. Furthermore, psychological awareness of the need to feel safe, secure, and, when young, protected, all speak to animals' rights to a voice in determining the adequacy of their lived environments and in reporting back 2 Action Research 0(0) about their experiences. This argument is framed by the following exploratory questions that set a challenge for PAR theory and practice:
1) Can PAR be used to address needs of other-than-human animals? 2) If so, what are the particular challenges faced in using this approach to conduct and communicate research? 3) What might PAR with animals look like?
While scholars in many academic disciplines (ethics, ethology, comparative psychology, and animal studies) focus on animals, the sociopolitical implications of animal use and abuse and the ethics of interacting with animals requires a new view, a re-conceptualization, in order to put these questions into practice. This article is a response to Reason and Bradbury's (2006, p. 7) call for a 'participatory worldview' that 'places human persons and communities as part of their worldboth human and more-than-human -embodied in their world, co-creating their world'. An avenue is trans-species psychology, which is a:
New field of science committed to the idea that animals have minds of their own just like we do. It marks a formal turning point in what we know, and even more significantly, what we do. . . . It calls for a science that serves humans and other animals alike without making one suffer at the expense of the other. (Bradshaw & Marino, 2007, p. 25) A goal of the trans-species view is to erase 'the conceptual walls that have held humans apart from other species ' (p. 25) . Trapping a baby elephant, killing her parents in front of her, and making her live in chains as part of the circus, is not unusual. Trans-species psychology asks us whether we would consider this appropriate treatment of human beings? The answer of course is no. Thus, trans-species psychology disallows this double standard, asks that animals be respected as individuals, and proffers it is human beings who may need to change the way they live with animals instead of the other way around. If the primary purpose of action research is 'to produce practical knowledge that is useful to people in the everyday conduct of their lives ' (Reason & Bradbury, 2006, p. 2) it follows that we can extend this objective to include animals. PAR, coupled with trans-species psychology, provides a missing link in the evolution of thinking about human and animal relationships demonstrating how it is possible to apply a liberatory framework to thinking about living mutually respectful, empathetic lives. As Bradshaw and Marino (2007, p. 26) note: 'Trans-species psychotherapists listen in and speak with animals much the way you might with another human: hearing with the heart.'
In the following sections I briefly describe action research and PAR and their phenomenological underpinnings, explore the promise of this method for listening to animals, introduce trans-species psychology as a tool and an ethical position, and discuss some of the challenges and applications yielded by this approach. 
Why PAR?
Action research emerged out of disenchantment with the traditional, quantitative, positivist research paradigm with a 'history rooted in the work and struggles of marginalized peoples, largely in the Majority World' (Etmanski & Pant, 2007, p. 277 ). This dialectic is evident in human being's co-created reality that takes place within a historically specific context. Thus, as a transformative, social justice-inspired perspective, action research includes ideas, but goes beyond study into action as 'research that produces nothing but books will not suffice' (Lewin, 1948, p. 202) . The transformative potential is based on three central characteristics (Stringer, 2007, p. xi): 1) Decentralization. A move away from the idea of generalizable 'truths' toward local knowledge and context. 2) Deregulation. A move away from conventional rules of research that emphasizes objectivity, reliability, and the notion of a knowable reality in order to have quality research. 3) Cooperativeness. Co-ownership of the process and the outcome without a hierarchical distinction between researcher and participant.
PAR, a form of action research, adds the key component of subjects' involvement in how research is developed, conducted, analyzed and disseminated, with emphasis on emancipation. With roots that reach outside the West, PAR is committed to 'further the interests of exploited groups' (Fals-Borda, 1987, p. 329) . Rather than typical top-down views of much social science research, this phenomenological approach advocates work with and among disenfranchised participants. PAR 'aims at creating an environment in which participants give and get valid information, make free and informed choices (including the choice to participate), and generate internal commitment to the results of their inquiry' (Argyris & Scho¨n, 1989, p. 613) . PAR adds humility to the Freirean cycles of reflection/action/reflection that respects and involves others at every step of the research process. At the heart of this phenomenological approach is the edict that researchers should tend to the things themselves. Rather than imposing the researcher's agenda on subjects, PAR engages communities and stakeholder groups wrestling with challenging questions that are not often heard. PAR holds space where experience can be understood in a social and historical context, where critical understandings can be built, differences and impacts explored, and emancipatory action initiated and reflected upon. The purpose is to ask questions in service of those one is speaking of and engaging with so that the desires of that group can be advanced by the initiating actions that transform the current state of affairs into one that would be more desirable from the participants' point of view. PAR involves 'attending both one's own values and responses to a situation as well as to others' who have a stake in the consequences of decisions' (Ladkin, 2006, p. 87) . This requires a particular quality of deep listening, of engaged mindfulness, of being fully present. It need not only take place between human beings. But how do we 'bracket', drawing on Husserl, or set aside, a subjective anthropocentric point of view in order to consider the perspective of other living beings? I propose a new paradigm that is subjective, interpretive, and concerned with making sense of experiences of animals within the context of their lived reality as co-participants in the research process: combining the methods of PAR with the tenets of transspecies psychology.
The promise of PAR for animals
Arguments justifying subjugation of animals traditionally come from science, social science, and Judeo-Christian edicts that argue for maintenance of absolute difference between humans and other beings. The divisions tend to cluster around three primary arguments: impossibility of intersubjectivity, lack of subjectivity, and lack of spoken language. First, the long argued point about intersubjectivity, that 'testifying of animals' inner experiences and feelings' is not possible, is based primarily on behavioral science evidence (Konecki, 2007, p. 3 ). Yet, expressions of empathy are part of the brains and minds of humans and of certain primates (De Waal, 2006) , dolphins (Herman, 2002; Kuczaj, Tranel, Trone, & Hill, 2001; Langer, 1984) , mice (Ganguli, 2007; Pierce, 2007) , elephants (Bradshaw & Marino, 2007; Poole, 2005) , and whales (Dudzinki & Frohoff, 2008; Milstein, 2007; Rothenberg, 2008; Simmonds, 2007) . These beings also demonstrate self-awareness, as in 'the ability to comprehend and think about oneself in the physical and mental realms' (Marino, 2004, p. 910) . How animals manifest self-awareness is evident among cats, for example. Alger and Alger (2003) cite instances in multicat households and shelters where cats demonstrate self-awareness by their ability to learn from others, adapt, cooperate, and employ other complex behaviors, all of which require communication. Both humans and other animals share a transspecies core self, 'that allows them to be active agents in the world as opposed to simply passive recipients of information' (Northoff & Panksepp, 2008, p. 259) . Furthermore, according to this argument, mammals also share a 'relational self ', 'consisting of strong affective colouring and manifested in the phenomenal experience of mindedness and belongingness ' (p. 263) .
Second, in terms of subjectivity, animals are minded social beings who 'have at least a rudimentary ability to construct meaning -to purposefully define situations and devise coherent plans of action on the basis of these definitions' (MacKenzie, 1999, p. 5) . Bekoff and Goodall (2007) , Bussolini (n.d.) , and Irvine (2004) observed dogs' and cats' play as socialization sites where shared understandings of 'rules' and intentions are learned and boundaries tested.
Third, language has been used as the coin of the realm separating humans from other beings. While it is acknowledged that certain animals use tools and
Merskin 5 communicate in complex systems of markings, gestures, and vocalizations, the persistent argument is humans have words, some of which are tied to abstract concepts. Mead (1962) argued that symbolic interaction could only take place when both parties possess a sense of self and, in particular, language. The ability to think, evidenced by language, he said, was central to the realization of full personhood and not possible in animals. We now know differently. Much social science research positions the study of consciousness as either investigations of first-person, subjective experiences and phenomena or third-person, objective correlates. The idea of the possibility of a second-person perspective appears in some of the work in linguistics, anthropology, and psychotherapy. Increasingly animals, as intelligent social beings who participate in a life world of their own, are being invited into these discussions. Trans-species psychology is one way of facilitating this. This approach paves the ethical and theoretical way for thinking about the 'more-than-human world' (Abram, 1997) . Whereas comparative psychology focuses on the psychological and behavioral lives of animals with comparisons in the way the human mind functions, the intent is not communication with another species. Trans-species psychology emphasizes non-hierarchical communication through 'disavowal of human privilege' (Bradshaw & Watkins, 2006, p. 72) , values the individual and his or her subjective experience, and argues that symptoms that result from oppression and stress (such as depression, violence, and self-mutilation) are forms of communication. A trans-species psychological approach therefore benefits both humans and other animals because it sees humans and other animals as in-relationship with one another as co-constitutive. It (re)minds and (re)affirms the human relationship with nature, and accomplishes this through recognition that not only humans suffer. The question is how might that happen?
PAR and trans-species psychology as ethical practice
Practices that support the empathetic sensibility of PAR emphasize the interconnectedness of physical health and psychological well-being as it refers to 'the ability of an individual to adapt to changes and challenges in its environment' (Carlstead, Wielebnowski, & Terio, 2004, p. 19) . PAR would be a particularly useful form of research to use at zoos and other captive situations where, for example, social animals need to live in communities with members of their families and friends in order to be emotionally and physically healthy. Conversely, solitary animals, such as cougars, need to be housed apart from one another since mothers raise their young away from males and other females. Zoos and aquariums now recognize it is not enough to think an animal is well because its physical needs are met. Changes in environment, experiences of capture, the impact of being looked at and touched by human beings, and other physiological stressors influence well-being.
Learning to read behavioral cues as indicators of health is critical. Some stressors seem obvious on one level, but such seemingly simple things as not housing prey animals across from predators (Clubb & Mason, 2003) , applying less invasive means for performing routine medical exams and tests on animals (Wielebnowski, Fletchall, Carlstead, Busson, & Brown, 2002) , or providing privacy opportunities for solitary animals (Swaisgood, White, Zhou, Zhang, & Zhang, 2001 ) significantly impact welfare.
As of yet we do not have 'a theory of the moral importance of species membership' (Nozick, 1983, p. 11) . Fortunately, like an itch needing a scratch, the question remains unanswered as to Homo sapiens superiority over other species because in fact 'there is no such plausible theory' (Singer, 2006, p. 4) . In recent years, the idea of trans-species psychology has gained attention as a philosophy and method designed to bridge this communicative gap. Trans-species psychology takes place when 'the interpenetration of human and animal domains in parity [are] absent the assumption of ascendance' (Bradshaw & Watkins, 2006, p. 71) . As both theory and praxis, this approach is one 'in which the interdependence and well-being of humans and animals can be understood in parity, in language, in concept, and in practice' (Bradshaw & Watkins, 2006, pp. 71-72) . If, for example, individuality is emblematic of personhood, then it follows that animals qualify. This controversial topic eliminates many of the constructed differences between humans and others when animals move to the position of a being with rights instead of being considered property or objects.
Skeptics would dismiss this discussion as over-anthropomorphizing. Yet, the way human beings have (or have not) engaged with other animals by denying the possibility that we share much in the ways of communicating and knowing has not resulted in the best worlds for either of us. Working toward a level of mutuality with other-than-human-animals benefits us all. This calls for engagement in 'environmental etiquette . . . a visibly enacted openness to the world, beyond individual comportment' (Weston, 2006, p. 81) with comportment leading to a deeply held 'moral dimension of epistemology' (Cheney, 2002, p. 91, italics added) . This helps us remember that other species have something to say in their specific ways of saying it. Context is key.
Every being has a self-world, or Umwelt, a subjective view and way of interacting (Von Uexku¨ll, 1934 Uexku¨ll, /1957 . Thus, changes in one being's life-world are impacted by changes in another's. Ruys and Schilling (2002) expanded this classic view to include three more specific contexts: individual, group, and ontogenetic. Attempts to understand the world through the animal's eyes must include attention to his or her relationship with others on the basis of shared or different characteristics such as age, sex, familiarity; of group structures that can culminate in shared languages and responses; and the social Umwelt, the ontogenetic context such as age specific vocalizations. This also suggests a certain amount of flexibility and regard for species, but also individual, differences. Dogs, for example, bark under certain shared conditions, but individual dogs have their own specific triggers. One of the major ethical questions facing use of PAR with and on the behalf of animals other than humans is 'is it possible to capture the animal's perspective and, if so, how does one go about it?' (Arluke & Sanders, 1996, p. 41) . Understanding the 'life world' of animals necessitates thinking of them as minded beings, 'a necessary Merskin 7
re-casting of the natural world' in order to engage in an ethical conversation and ethical action (Arluke & Sanders, 1996, p. 57) . Ethical action is first and foremost:
an attempt to open up possibilities, to enrich the world. It is not an attempt to respond to the world as already known. On the usual view, for example, we must first know what animals are capable of, and then decide on that basis whether and how we are to consider them ethically. On the alternative view, we will have no idea of what other animals are actually capable -we will not readily understand them -until we already have approached them ethically; that is, until we have offered them the space and time, the occasion, and the acknowledgment necessary to enter into relationship. Ethics must come first. (Cheney & Weston, 1999, pp. 117-118) This approach requires re-visioning research, communication, and community. It is a move that goes beyond typical categorizations as a way of dismantling hierarchical structures that is consistent with multi-centrism (Weston, 2006 ) and Plumwood's (2002) call for dual affirmation that de-centers the human and values the animal. PAR recognizes and honors multiple ways of knowing as the approach does not privilege the researcher over participants. Furthermore, 'how things changed, because of the relationships between participants and their shared work is the focus of PAR and the reporting of it' (McTaggart, 1998, p. 222) . The goal is 'to improve the concrete particulars of people's lives, rather than just give voice to people's lives, gratification, and pain' (p. 222).
Substituting the word 'animal' for 'people' in the preceding quote opens space for considering how PAR might be used to improve the quality of animal lives. But what if the participant cannot speak in a language the researcher understands? How can other animal species participate in the research process? Voice their concerns? Report back? Effect change? What might PAR with animals look like through a trans-species psychological lens? In terms of praxis, Davis and Demello (2003, p. xxiv) answer these questions by suggesting four steps: 'research, observation, rumination, and intuition' that reflect PAR cycles, illustrated in the following sections. I add reporting and recommendation as a fifth step.
An exploration of PAR with animals
In India, three teenage males go on a killing spree. In America, a 31-year-old female, living in a halfway house is treated for the symptoms of PTSD, having been subjected to experiments, isolation, and mistreatment earlier in life. In Africa, an inconsolable infant cries for his mother, a victim of the genocide he witnessed. Orphaned twins, left to starve after the murder of their mother, are rescued but fail to thrive and die. In each case all of the individuals are animals: elephants, a chimpanzee, a dolphin, and cougar cubs, respectively. If PAR 'issues from the felt needs of the community' (Park, 1999, p. 143) how might researchers identify the needs of animals such as these or head off violence and subsequent emotional suffering? Or, in less dramatic situations such as habitat encroachment, how might animal voices be added to the mix of opinions when urban growth boundaries, for example, are discussed?
Getting beyond linguistic limitations is one of the greatest hurdles to conducting PAR with animals. Even if we can take the obvious step and recognize that they do communicate, we must confront the fact that we do not speak the same language. This 'discursive struggle' (Milstein, 2007, p. 188 ) must include empirical observations, but go beyond them. In PAR with animals, this means the researcher providing (and gathering) as much information as possible from as many theoretical perspectives as possible including the value of story-telling on part of those who experience animals in the field as well as those who study animal needs from afar. 'The goal here is to establish mutual commitment to thoughtfully planned changes in practice, individual and collective' (McTaggart, 1998, p. 224) .
Critical theory advocates for the voicing of needs of previously silenced groups of people and PAR makes that possible, even when a shared spoken language is impossible to achieve. When representing the interests of animals, beings who have no access to power, to voice in the way we typically regard as communication requires, 'intimate interaction and empathy with the perspective of the other [as] the major sources of this knowledge' (Arluke & Sanders, 1996, p. 56) . Just as this article seeks to 'reshape the semantic space' (McTaggart, 1998, p. 211) of participants in PAR, so too does the term 'validity' need a revised location for consideration within PAR goals.
McTaggart (1998, p. 224) articulates 'points of reference' as quality checks (versus the limiting concept of 'rules of validity') that make PAR in this, as well as other contexts, 'more useful, understandable, and defensible to all concerned'. This requires 'establishing credibility among participants and informants', collaboration with stakeholders, an 'audit trail' of observations and reflections, and finally, a checking back with the community. One can certainly argue that animals have a stake in their own survival and quality of life, but 'how does one give voice to an animal who cannot speak?' (Davis & Demello, 2003, p. xxiv) . This requires moving beyond the design of one who is object to subject and active participant in the process. Along with consideration of what biologists and ethnologists can tell us about physiological needs of animals, awareness of the limits of subjectivity is important. The researcher must collect as much information about the community of concern (the animals) from as many sources as possible to ascertain how the world might look from the perspective of the species.
Thus, 'it is essential for the investigator to learn how to take the role of the animal-other and communicate effectively in the appropriate idiom' (Arluke & Sanders, 1996, p. 47) . Furthermore, 'a necessary condition for success . . . is a continuous sympathetic observation of an animal under as natural conditions as possible. To some degree one must transfer oneself into the animal's situation and inwardly partake in its behavior ' (Nice, 1989 , as quoted in Lawrence, 1988 . Direct observation of animals or narratives of those who have spent time with them is crucial part of the experience. Issues of complexity and reciprocity with those who represent the interests of animals are based on expertise. Insider/outsider Merskin 9 positionality is even more complex as the vantage point from which one looks at or into the community and through what lens is complicated by species differences. Reflexivity is an ongoing concern as are other quality checks such as 'for whom and for what' is the research being conducted (Martı´& Villasante, 2009, p. 386) . Since this is research being done by people for animals, feedback, orientation, and dialogue among advocates (who will define and redefine quality) are critical steps. Whereas human beings who do not have access to the same knowledge often rely advocates to help articulate views and explain ideas, animals also 'cannot name their own world' (Lynch, 1999, p. 52) . There must similarly be reciprocity between the human researcher and the animal, achieved through informed study and engagement with the lived experiences of the animal. Feminist standpoint theory argues 'human advocates are required to articulate the standpoint of the animalsgleaned . . . in dialogue with them -to wit, that they do not wish to be slaughtered and treated in painful and exploitative ways' (Donovan, 2007, p. 362 ). These human advocates can then organize and defend 'against the practices that reify and commodify animal subjects' (p. 362) at whatever level, be it in issues of borders and boundaries, symbolically in forms of public opinion, or in more threatening situations such as treatment of farmed animals. This post-Cartesian paradigm brings the scholar/listener into relationship with the subject as co-participant in ways that, combined with other ways of knowing (ethology, ethnography, psychology, folklore) can bring us closer to hearing what animal others need and desire.
Bird brains
In Alex & me, MIT-and Harvard-trained scientist Irene M. Pepperberg (2008, p. 25 ) reflects on what she calls the 'epiphany' that allowed her to 'see what had been there all along, invisible to me: Alex's [an African Gray parrot] and my work together had not been in vain.' Pepperberg's work, about the cognitive and communicative abilities of African Gray parrots and how they compare with mammals, examines referential vocal learning, computation skills, speech and language, and numerical abilities. Alex used 'elements of English speech to identify 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities up to and including 6 and a zero-like concept ' (2008, cover) . He combined concepts and could identify more than one hundred items; his emotional equivalent was gauged to be about age two.
It was not until Alex's death in 2007 at age 31 that Pepperberg was able to shed the weight of self-doubt that 30 years of working with a bird, and seeing him as a named individual rather than a number, had produced. Today, she argues the reductionism of science that draws distinct lines between species is complicit in the destruction of the natural world. The notion of separateness that humans have so long held from other animals has resulted in part in consequences such as climate change, widespread poverty, and starvation. Pepperberg writes about the bond that went beyond the (considerable) science she also compiled. Drawing on multi-disciplinary research, Pepperberg used PAR and trans-species psychology not only because she engaged in collaborative participatory research with 10 Action Research 0(0) humans and animals, but also in the way she reported the results. This research continues, challenging and changing the view of birds as unintelligent and unimaginative, thereby resulting in better forms of treatment and care of them. What Pepperberg and associates learned with and through Alex has since been applied to help children with learning disabilities.
Whale tale
Building on his research with birds and sound, musician and philosopher David Rothenberg wanted to know whether humans could communicate with whales using music. In Thousand Mile Whale Song, Rothenberg (2008) talks with scientists, scholars, poets, tour operators, and, in his own way, the whales. Going beyond new age popularizations of whale 'songs', Rothenberg gathered whale research in laboratories and in the field as well as what tour operators and whale watchers observed in everyday life. Rothenberg argues animals have something to say and that we should take animal 'songs' seriously, be they by 'mockingbirds, crickets, coyotes, or marmots' (p. 7).
Traveling to Canada to listen orcas, Hawaii for humpbacks, and Russia to hear belugas, Rothenberg played his own instrument (a clarinet) using underwater technology, to see if the whales sounded back (they did). Based on scientific research, observation, collaboration of interested others, and the whales themselves, Rothenberg surmised that whales (and dolphins) enjoy thinking about and engaging in sounds. These sounds are a form of language. Using advanced underwater technologies such as webcams and other forms of underwater 'spy games' (Dudzinki & Frohoff, 2008, p. xiv) , researchers at least partially enter whale worlds and observe and listen to what is going on.
Rothenberg's phenomenological approach acknowledges the role of local people in the process of species and habitat preservation. He notes, 'good thing there are witnesses on the water taking in all the changes -someone has to notice such things to remind us what is truly worth saving ' (p. 24) . This kind of reflection and rumination are critical parts of the PAR research cycle. At this stage, the researcher, armed with the combined knowledge and experience of collaborative research and observation, thinks deeply about the project, the participants, and perspective. Opening up the senses to what is happening in the animal's experience is critical. Researchers must 'become intimately involved with the animal-other and carefully attuned to [his or her] emotional experience' (p. 41). Thus, an interpretive, PAR/ phenomenological investigation of 'being-in-the-world might be fruitfully applied to the study of human-animal relationships' (Herzog & Burghardt, 1988, pp. 91-92) .
A risk associated with using this research philosophy and method with animals is being dismissed as fanatical, as was Grizzly Man Timothy Treadwell or Wolf Man Shaun Ellis (Brown, 2007, n.p.) . Unlike Treadwell, who critics claim was involved in a narcissistic rage against the American national parks systems, Ellis lived among a trio of captive wolves in an effort to see, as closely as possible, the Merskin 11 world through their eyes in hopes of reducing border and livestock conflicts with humans. He described being with the wolves as a dramaturgical role he played and getting into character as part of the process of being in relationship with them. Communication was a key part of his experiment -to use wolf howls from one pack to discourage others from coming onto farm property.
Validation and voice
Each turn of the PAR spiral adds to researcher and participant knowledge, leading, ideally to a mutually satisfying solution to a problem or answer to a question. Typically knowledge gained at the research setting is introduced back into the community of study, and conceivably can be used as an academic case study for others who are interested in employing this form of knowledge generation. This might then be applied to similar situations hence adding to the transferability, or external validity of the work (public knowledge). One possibility is McDaid's (2009, p. 464) 'the equality of condition framework', a democratic PAR model that examines barriers such as 'capacity, competency, and understanding' present in human situations of disadvantage, particularly in people's access to mental health services. Although the equality of condition framework is used in situations of social disadvantages faced by human beings, its intent is also applicable to animals. This framework identifies 'four dimensions of inequality that result in a subject's lack of equality: power, respect and recognition, resources and love, care and solidarity ' (p. 465) . Through this lens it is possible to see the need for actions to create more equal power relations between humans and other animals by applying it to beings who cannot verbally communicate because of species differences and, as a result, whose views aren't either taken seriously or considered at all. This would enable all beings to have access to and participate in decision-making that affects their lives. Collecting 'data', in the form of research, literature reviews, views of the advocates, policy-makers, publics, and, importantly, the participants (the animals), and reflecting on that information is the best we presently can do toward validity in this form of PAR. McTaggart (1998, p. 225) argues, 'validating is an explicit process of dialogue . . . not achieved by adherence to a fixed ''procedure' '' and, importantly, 'validity is a property of inferences . . . of interpretations and conclusions people make of information and the theoretical frameworks which guide its collection and use ' (p. 226) . Using PAR and trans-species psychology requires us to engage with other beings using all of our science, our senses, and our sense of spirit, and to do so consciously and reflexively, putting personal preferences as much aside as possible while honoring individual motivations. Plumwood (2002, p. 31 ) says the solution is not a simple 'strategy of reversal', which only serves to re-energize, maintain, and thus reify positions of power maintaining the 'logic' of hierarchy. As such, the human/animal other dichotomy is not only value-laden but also politically loaded. What does it take to change these dual dynamics? A re-visioning of humans and other-than-human animals as ecological selves in-relationship with one another that are 'essentially related and interdependent ' (p. 153) . Furthermore, 'by no means [does] every dichotomy result in a dualism' (p. 47), nor does it always have to result in division. A dualism is not only and/or necessarily contrasting pairs. It is the social construction of differences that concretizes into hierarchies that appear unchangeable. In an exclusionary culture, built on powerful religious edict that espouses and legitimizes devaluation of animals, exclusion appears normal and natural. Reality is made 'not only of concrete facts and (physical) things, but also includes the ways in which the people involved with these facts perceive them' (Friere, 1982, p. 30) . This 'master model . . . is a legacy, a form of culture, a form of rationality, a framework for self-hood and relationship which, through this appropriation of culture, has come to shape us all' (Plumwood, 2002, p. 190) .
Scholars from a variety of disciplines intimately interact with animals and have long been arguing for admission of other-than-human animals to the fold of beingness (Goodall, 1986; Shapiro, 1990) . Strict adherence to a clinical behavioristic positivist approach is inadequate and insufficient for finding explanations. Appreciative inquiry into animal lives includes science as well as observation, reflection, sharing, cooperation, and acting. Drawing on Freire (1985) this approach requires observation and development of a critical consciousness of the experiences of participants, one that deconstructs the current hierarchical, hegemonic structure of individuals and institutions. Although in Freire's (1985, p. 51) view this requires a situation in which researcher and subject are 'equally knowing subjects', human advocates and allies who are educated in the ways of animals can bring us nearer that goal. The researcher must be committed to long-term change that addresses structural inequalities and inequities. Freire (2000, p. 91 ) states this can be accomplished through dialogue that 'is nourished by ''love, humility, and faith.'' When the two ''poles'' of the dialogue are thus linked by love, hope, and mutual trust they can join in a critical search for something. Only dialogue truly communicates.'
Conclusion
Jane Goodall rocked the primatology world by naming the Gombe chimps. Psychobiologist Savage-Rumbaugh's co-authoring work with primates is radical evidence of listening-in to animal's communicative needs and giving them credit for their contributions. For more than 20 years Savage-Rumbaugh has been 'attempting to discern the degree to which they can think and communicate as we do'. Not privileging the way we do but rather, that we do and asking 'can they?' By thinking of Alex the parrot as an individual with something to say and contribute beyond what statistics said, Pepperberg brought new understanding to the human relationship with birds. Rothenberg found a community of voices on land and in the sea that 'speak' to one another sometimes by saying nothing at all. Their arguments are not that humans and other animals are identical, but we certainly share many attributes that need to be explored, not abandoned, simply because there are differences.
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Just as ways and means to communicate with people with severe mental and physical disabilities (Bogdan & Taylor, 1989; McDaid, 2009) , infants (Brazelton, 1984) , Alzheimer's patients (Gubrium, 1986) , and mentally challenged individuals requires innovative approaches to collecting information and 'speaking for' another person when he or she is unable to, so a PAR researcher working with animals would have to draw on multiple sources. While always an outsider within the animal community, a PAR researcher could come closer to the animal setting of insider by working with those who have intimately studied amongst the animals. PAR could be used in situations where animal and human communities come into conflict and measures toward resolution have been or are found ineffective, for example, urban growth boundary issues and coyotes in the American southwest.
Three questions were posited at the beginning of this article having to do with the appropriateness, challenges, and form of using PAR to address needs of otherthan-human animals. In some ways these questions present a challenge to PAR researchers -if the intent is truly to give voice to marginalized individuals, isn't it incumbent upon us to include all beings in that embrace? What might this mean to practice? My intent is to bring attention to this ethically appropriate next step. To reach the same level of love, joy, and self-actualization Freire (2000) proffers for oppressed humans, animals need to be welcomed into the embrace of multi-centric view (Weston, 2006) . Just as Freire's pedagogical vision expands to envelop a larger universe of human beings, it can, and I argue must, include animals as oppressed as well. George Bernard Shaw (1897, p. 32) reminds us 'the worst sin towards our fellow creatures is not to hate them, but to be indifferent to them: that's the essence of inhumanity'. The ideology of superiority that underpins racism, sexism, and homophobia, similarly frames and supports that of speciesism. Drawing on McTaggert's (1998) argument that PAR can be emancipatory, despite the time it takes to address and dismantle institutionalized injustices, this essay argues that PAR's social justice approach urgently needs to be applied to all communities of beings, not only humans. As an 'emancipatory project', PAR with animals works toward improvement in lived conditions and recognizes it as a process, from which no immediate concrete ideal condition will appear all at once. As PAR 'works on critique of current conditions and more or less immediate attempts at concrete improvement, its referent is ''Are things better than they were?'' not ''Are we emancipated yet?' '' (p. 245).
Thomas Berry (2006, p. 38) eloquently opined, 'the universe is composed of subjects to be communed with, not of objects to be exploited'. While this phenomenological approach carries with it tensions, through informed speculation and collaboration by working with animals and advocates, researchers can help heal by validating animal experiences. Savage-Rumbaugh's work with primates described at the beginning of this essay is one example of listening-in to animal's communicative needs. For more than 20 years she 'attempt[ed] to discern the degree to which they can think and communicate as we do' (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994, n.p.) , not privileging the way we do but rather, that we do and asking, 'can they?' If we restrict ourselves to requiring other primates to think like humans, we won't learn about them or ourselves. We must approach interactions and relationships with and between other animals, birds, reptiles, and birds the way we approach any other culture we do not understand.
As the animal world is changed and changing through interaction with human beings, animals and demarcation of borderlands, there is an urgent need to love and to love nature for what she involves. As a method and as a radical tool of translation and transformation, PAR thereby embraces the cycle of action-reflection-action necessary for taking a phenomenological liberatory approach using trans-species psychology in order to hear what other-than-human animals have to say about their worlds, needs, and desires. If PAR is 'the search for understanding in the company of friends' (Stringer, 1996, p. 215) , I argue animals need to, and should be, among them. In a world that is quickly, environmentally, coming undone, the need to cooperate and communicate is urgent. PAR is a particularly powerful method by which stakeholders can bring their particular point of view to the table for a discussion of interests and needs of both humans and animals.
